

THE HELLENISTIC MILITARY COLONY: A HERODIAN EXAMPLE

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Josephus' description of the colony of Babylonian Jews set up by Herod the Great in Batanaea provides an interesting account of the founding of a Hellenistic military colony.¹ The description however, has been largely ignored by ancient historians; it has been noted very briefly by Schalit and Bickerman although it has been bypassed by Tarn.² Herod, of course, was not a Seleucid but he was very much a Hellenistic prince—his building programs, his refoundation of cities and his donations to various foreign institutions all attest to this.³ By founding a colony in Batanaea Herod was therefore once again following an established Hellenistic practice. Consequently in view of the dearth of source material on the establishment of military colonies it seems reasonable to consider the passage of Josephus as part of the evidence which must be analyzed in any study of the nature of the famous Seleucid settlements. In this paper I propose to examine the evidence from Batanaea first with regard to both the Herodian and Seleucid approach to colonization and then with regard to the political events which influenced the nature of the Herodian colony.

¹ The account is found in *Antiquitates Judaicae* 17.23–31. In this paper I use the abbreviations *AJ* for Josephus' *Antiquitates Judaicae*, *BJ* for his *Bellum Judaicum* and *RC* for C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven 1934).

² A. Schalit *Koenig Herodes* (Berlin 1969) 328 and E. Bickerman (*Institutions des Séleucides* (Paris 1938) 86. Besides Bickerman see the accounts of the Seleucid settlements by W. W. Tarn in *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge 1938) 1–33 and M. Rostovtzeff in both his *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates* (Leipzig 1910) 240–68 and *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941) 472–502. As far as I can see however, neither scholar refers to the Herodian evidence.

³ On Herod as a Hellenistic monarch see A. Schalit (above, note 2) 403 ff.

Before beginning the investigation it would be useful I think to describe briefly the events leading up to the founding of the settlement.⁴ In 22 and 20 B.C. Herod was granted the territory of Trachonitis, Auranitis and Batanaea by Augustus. In 12 B.C. while Herod was in Italy a revolt broke out in Trachonitis. The rebels escaped to a nearby Nabataean chieftain, Syllaeus. Herod repeatedly appealed for help to the governor of Syria, Saturninus; finally in 10 B.C. Saturninus authorized Herod to march into Nabataea to seize the rebels and to collect an outstanding debt owed to him by Syllaeus. Upon completing this operation Herod left a settlement of three thousand Idumaeans in Trachonitis. Syllaeus had meanwhile sailed off to Rome to complain to Augustus; his mission was so successful that Augustus in anger notified Herod that their friendship was at an end and that the latter would henceforth be treated as a subject. This diplomatic upset for Herod sparked a rebellion in Trachonitis which resulted in the overthrow of the Idumaeans settlement. Through the efforts of Nicolaus of Damascus however, Herod was soon able to effect a reconciliation with Augustus. Herod thereupon decided to settle a colony of Babylonian Jews not in Trachonitis itself but rather along the border area of the adjacent toparchy of Batanaea.⁵

In discussing Seleucid foundations Tarn explains that only the king could found a city whereas a subordinate usually handled the work related to the establishment of a colony. As evidence he points to the non-dynastic names of certain settlements. According to Tarn these were probably named after the royal official who founded them.⁶ He apparently also bases his claim on the fact that Antiochus III wrote to his governor Zeuxis and had him handle all the arrangements connected with the settling of some Jewish colonists in Asia Minor (*AJ* 12.148). The situation in Batanaea however, was different. In this instance

⁴ See Josephus, *AJ* 15.343-64; 16.271-355; 17.23-31.

⁵ A. H. M. Jones claims that Herod used the Idumaeans and then the Babylonian Jews as settlers because he did not fully trust "real native Jews" [*The Herods of Judaea* (Oxford 1938) 78]. However, there were in addition sound military reasons for Herod's choice of settlers. In the first place the Babylonian Jews were apparently well known in antiquity for their military prowess [see A. Schalit "The Letter of Antiochus III to Zeuxis" *Jewish Quarterly Review* 50 (1960) 297-98]. And secondly this particular group was skilled—as archers—in the same method of fighting for which the Trachonites were famed (*BJ* 2.58).

⁶ Tarn (above, note 2) 11.

Herod dealt directly with the leader of the colony. For although he granted the tax exemptions directly to the colonists, he gave control of the land to Zamaris.⁷ And inasmuch as Josephus does not mention the subsequent distribution of *kléroi* to the settlers we can assume that this task was left to Zamaris rather than to a royal official.⁸ But why the difference? Of course Herod's kingdom was smaller than the Seleucids'; the delegation of such authority was probably unnecessary and Zamaris himself could act as a surrogate official for Herod. But more significant is the fact that the type of settlement we find in Batanaea, in which the leader was given control of the land, is somewhat unique: it is not to be found—as far as I know—in the extant evidence on the Seleucid colonies. On the other hand, the Batanaean settlement does exhibit strong similarities both to Hellenistic feudal villages and in particular to a Ptolemaic military colony which existed in Ammonitis around 260 B.C. Ammonitis was at that time under the control of Tobias, a local nobleman who had large land holdings in the area. In addition Tobias also had on his land a fortress—(*birta*) in which he apparently resided—or at least conducted business. A papyrus dated to 259 B.C. records a deed of sale drawn up in the *birta* of Ammonitis (PCZ 59003). Among the witnesses were two men who are specifically called *κληροῦχοι* of Tobias (PCZ 59003.19). These *κληροῦχοι* were part of a group of military colonists who had been sent out by Ptolemy Philadelphus to Trans-Jordan. Tcherikover suggests, quite plausibly, that the colony itself was within the confines of Tobias' land.⁹ Furthermore, as *κληροῦχοι* of Tobias these men quite probably would have been given land by him. Thus Tobias was both a sheikh and the head of a military colony entrusted to him by Ptolemy.¹⁰ Of course it was politically expedient for the Ptolemies to cultivate the friendship of the district chief of Ammonitis both for security reasons and to ease their own administrative burden. Furthermore the reason for the establishment of a settlement in this region is

⁷ Thus see *AJ* 17.26 and 29 and the discussion below.

⁸ Compare also the distribution of allotments described in Plutarch *Eumenes* 8.

⁹ The large bibliography on the Tobiads is conveniently collected by V. A. Tcherikover and A. Fuks (eds.) in *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* 1 (Cambridge 1957) 118. PCZ 59003 = *CPJud* #1.

¹⁰ See Tcherikover and Fuks (above, note 9) 116 and R. Vincent, "La Palestine dans les papyrus ptolémaïques de Gerza," *Revue biblique* 29 (1920) 185.

not far to seek: it helped protect the eastern border of the Ptolemaic kingdom from attack by neighboring Arabs.¹¹

The same strategic reasoning—control of his northeastern frontier—stood behind Herod's decision to send a military colony to Batanaea. But the similarity does not end there; for the Herodian settlement was also organized on lines distinctly similar to that of Tobias. The Batanaean colony was composed of a Mesopotamian nobleman, Zamaris, and his retainers. According to Josephus, *ὁ βαβυλώνιος* (Zamaris) . . . ἐπὶ κτήσει τῇσδε τῆς χώρας Ἡρώδη προσποιεῖται. (*AJ* 17.29). In other words, besides being the leader of a group of military settlers he was also made a chieftain of the territory. Furthermore the narrative (*ὁ βαβυλώνιος* . . . λαβὼν τὴν γῆν φρούρια ὑποδομήσατο καὶ κώμην *AJ* 17.26) implies that the colony was to be on the land given to Zamaris. And insomuch as it was Zamaris who distributed the *klêroi* it is possible to consider the Batanaean colonists, in the same way as their Tobiad predecessors, the *κληροῦχοι* of their leader.

But whether or not Zamaris actually owned the land on which the settlement was built is not clear. We can consider two possibilities: the Babylonian either held the colony as a tenant for the king, or he held it in full ownership as part of his estate.¹² As noted above there is no evidence for a Seleucid military colony which was under the ownership of a single nobleman. But there is evidence that the ownership or rental of villages by noblemen was not uncommon in the Hellenistic era. Such villages were usually part of an estate that had been sold or given by the king to a particular individual. To mention some examples: the village of Baetocaece in Syria had at one time been the property of a certain Demetrius (*RC* 70.6); Laodice bought a large estate which included a village, Pannucome, from Antiochus II (*RC* 18.2); and the famous Mnesimachus inscription from Sardis records that he had been awarded a large estate in Lydia; this estate, given by Antigonos, included several villages.¹³ In the case of Mnesimachus, the rent paid for the villages on his estate indicates

¹¹ Tcherikover and Fuks (above, note 9) 117.

¹² Another possibility of course, is that while the colony—i.e. the village—was on the estate, the individual land allotments remained beyond the confines of the estate.

¹³ See W. H. Buckler and D. M. Robinson *Sardis VII*, part 1 (Leyden: 1932) #1.

that he held them only as a tenant.¹⁴ On the other hand Demetrius probably held Baetocaece and Laodice certainly held her village in full ownership.¹⁵ Thus, the award of a large estate to Zamaris and the probable inclusion within the estate of a colony reflected an established Hellenistic practice. Josephus, however, does not indicate whether the Babylonian held the colony in usufruct or in full *dominium*. The fact that Herod's successors did exact tax payments from the colonists—whereas Herod did not—indicates either that they forcibly changed the status of the colony or that the colony, despite its tax-exempt status, was only being managed by Zamaris and was not a full part of the estate given to him.¹⁶ On the other hand the fact that the original settlers did not have to pay any *φόρος* and the clear indications by Josephus that Zamaris was given the land (*AJ* 17.25; 26) suggest that the colony was to be held in full ownership by the leader.

Josephus' description of the *κατοίκησις* in Batanaea makes it clear that the settlement comprised two elements: a village and several fortresses (*AJ* 17.25–6).¹⁷ Thus we should visualize a village in some central location and fortresses strung out in the vicinity.¹⁸ Most

¹⁴ See K. M. T. Atkinson, "A Hellenistic Land—Conveyance: The Estate of Mnesimachus in the Plain of Sardis" *Historia* 21 (1972) 58.

¹⁵ See G. Mc. Harper, Jr., "Village Administration in the Roman Province of Syria" *YCS* 1 (1928) 160–62. Another recently discovered example of villages held by a Seleucid nobleman was published by Y. H. Landau "A Greek Inscription found near Hefzibah" in *Israel Exploration Journal* 16 (1966) 54–70. The inscription, dated to 201–195 B.C. (67–70), records a series of orders given by Antiochus III and his son for the benefit of Ptolemaius, the governor of Syria; the inscription also includes two memoranda of Ptolemaius. According to Landau Ptolemaius had been an Egyptian commander who defected to Antiochus III during the Fourth Syrian War (66). In one of the memoranda Ptolemaius mentions *εἰς τὰς ὑπ[αρχ]ούσας μοι κώ[μ]ας / [ἐγ]κτῆσει καὶ εἰς [τ]ὸ πᾶ[τ]ρικὸν καὶ εἰς [ἀς] σὺ (King Antiochus) προ[σ]έταξας καταγράψ[αι](?) . . .* (11.22–23). Landau suggests that Ptolemaius had held the villages as a vassal of the Egyptian king and that Antiochus III guaranteed his continued possession if he should defect (66 and n. 14).

¹⁶ Zenodorus, Herod's predecessor in Batanaea and Trachonitis had previously governed the area in lease-hold from Augustus (*BJ* 1.398). However, his inability to control brigandage there prompted Augustus to transfer the territory to Herod (*BJ* 1.399).

¹⁷ The more usual terms for a Hellenistic settlement was, of course, *katoikia*. See Fr. Oertel, *RE* 21 (1921) 1–8, s.v. "Katoikoi."

¹⁸ Josephus' description of the village as being "not inferior in size to a city" (*AJ* 17.23) is curious. The same phrase is used to describe Lydda in *AJ* 20.130. Since Bathyra was considered a city with respect to *μέγεθος* it is probable that lack of fortification relegated it to village status. In another passage (*AJ* 18.28) Josephus makes it quite

probably the fortresses were meant only for guard duty and shelter in emergency situations, that is not for permanent residence. For otherwise the building of the village would have been rendered superfluous and the settlers would simply have lived permanently in the fortresses.

The colony at Batanaea was to consist of six hundred men: five hundred mercenaries and another hundred *συγγενεῖς*. Thus excluding later additions we can visualize the total population of the original colony at approximately 2,500 including women and children.¹⁹ The one hundred *συγγενεῖς* were probably artisans and merchants—the men whose presence would assure a stable and permanent settlement rather than just a transient garrison. It is noteworthy that Herod made certain that the original ethnic make-up of the settlement be uniform.²⁰ The fact that all the settlers were Jewish is not simply fortuitous nor is it just because the “hiring” kingdom was a Jewish one. The earlier, unsuccessful colony which the Babylonian Jews were replacing had also been composed of one national group: three thousand Idumaeans. Apparently such uniformity was highly desirable in the setting up of colonies. Quite likely the lack of racial or religious mixture avoided potential problems in the internal life of the colony.²¹

clear that strong fortifications were a necessary requisite for the elevation of a village to a *polis* [see V. Tscherikover, *Die hellenistischen Städtegrundungen* (Leipzig 1927) 114–5 and Harper (above note 15) 105–8]. The presence of nearby fortresses made it unnecessary to fortify the village as well. In times of urgency it was probably normal procedure to withdraw to one or more of the fortresses (see, for instance, Josephus *Vita* 183 and Diodorus Siculus 17.50.3).

¹⁹ In contrast, Herod's new *polis* of Sebaste had a mixed population of six thousand founders (*οἰκήτορας* BJ 1.403) consisting of retired soldiers and groups of local peoples.

²⁰ The implication that all the settlers (both cavalmen and *συγγενεῖς*) were Jewish is clear both from the account in AJ 17 and from *Vita* 54 where Josephus refers to the descendants of the settlers as “the Babylonian Jews.”

²¹ Antiochus IV Epiphanes also aimed at uniformity within his colonies (*Daniel* 11.39). It was a general Seleucid policy to organize colonies along national lines. Thus there were colonies of Macedonians (OGIS 211) Thessalian Larissans (*Diod.* 33.4A), Macedonians and Mysians (OGIS 338, an Attalid colony probably dating from the Seleucid period). In general see the list in Bickerman (above, note 2) 80. n. 2. It is possible that the various ethnic terms eventually lost their national significance and became purely artificial designations [as did happen in Egypt; see *Tebtunis Papyri* I, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (London 1902), p. 546 and F. M. Heichelheim, *Die auswärtige Bevölkerung im Ptolemäerreich* (Leipzig 1925) 13 f.]. But in the initial founding stages of most Seleucid colonies the settlers of a particular colony were usually of one national or civic origin [see Rostovtzeff (above, note 2) 490].

The colony was given its *ἐλευθερία* by Herod (*AJ* 17.28).²² The most visible reflection of the grant may be seen in the freedom allowed the colonists in their choice of internal government. Herod did not give a constitution to the colonists. Josephus' remark that the colony was attractive to other Jews as a place of settlement, in part because of the possibility offered of living according to the Jewish ancestral laws indicates that Jewish law formed the constitutional basis of life in the settlement. The situation in Batanaea recalls a similar, earlier situation under Antiochus III in Asia Minor. Antiochus III settled two thousand Jewish families there in an effort to keep Phrygia and Lydia under his control. One of the specific provisions for these latter settlers was that they be allowed to use their own laws (*AJ* 12.150). In contrast to the freedom allowed both these groups of colony-founders, the new inhabitants of Sebaste—a city in Samaria being refounded by Herod—were given a constitution by the king (*BJ* 1.403). And considering the heavily Greek character of the city we can expect that its government was likewise modelled on a Greek original. The population of Sebaste was quite a bit larger than at Bathyra and also more diverse. To allow the new citizens of Sebaste the freedom to determine their own type of internal government would probably have produced innumerable claims and counter-claims by various groups of the population.²³ The imposition of a constitution initially meant more work for the king; but later on it also avoided many problems. From this point of view one can more easily appreciate the advantages inherent in keeping a colony ethnically uniform. The civic law did not need any outside organization and supervision. The colony could be—and was—arranged according to laws that were acceptable to all and that would require no special statutes for particular national groups.

²² Josephus' statement that Herod's grandson, Agrippa, did not take away the colonists' *ἐλευθερία* implies that this freedom had been previously given, most probably by Herod himself. The precise details of this grant of *ἐλευθερία* are difficult to specify. Obviously freedom from taxation, except under Herod, was not part of it (*AJ* 17.28). On the ambiguity of the term *ἐλευθερία*—and the concept—in Hellenistic times see A. H. M. Jones *The Greek City* (Oxford 1940) 101.

²³ The difficulties of controlling a city of mixed population are quite vividly illustrated by the experience of the Romans in Caesarea. According to Josephus it was a religious riot between the Jews and the Greek of that city which led to the outbreak of the Jewish War (*BJ* 2.285–92).

Another enticement for the colonists was the grant of a tax-exemption. It was a common practice to encourage the expeditious settlement of new colonies by grants of tax-exemptions for the first few years. Thus when Antiochus III settled the Jews in Asia Minor he granted them tax relief for ten years on their agricultural produce (*AJ* 12.151).²⁴ Herod did not act differently toward the settlers of Bathyra—only more generously. He granted the colonists permanent *ἀτέλεια* as well as permanent remittance of the *φόρος*. The generous nature of this grant perhaps hints at the difficulty Herod encountered in attracting potential settlers. The area to be settled was far from hospitable. The native population in the vicinity was actively hostile and already had destroyed a previous settlement. Furthermore the land allotments that were being offered to the settlers were hardly the best. The very name of the area immediately adjacent to the settlement, Trachonitis, indicates the inferior nature of the land.²⁵ In contrast to the settlers in Asia Minor who were given cleared land—i.e. land under or ready for cultivation (*AJ* 12.151)—the settlers in Batanaea were to receive only land which was *ἄπρακτον*—unworked (*AJ* 17.25).

The land-problem facing the Batanaean settlers is illustrated further by contrast with the new inhabitants of Sebaste. The new settlers of the city were given allotments which are described as “very fertile” (*BJ* 1.403). This should not be surprising. Sebaste was really the refoundation of a city on the site of the earlier capital of the kingdom of Israel. Not only was the land in the vicinity fertile, but it had already been under cultivation for hundreds of years. Thus the new settlers were being given land which would immediately produce substantial yields.²⁶ Quite likely because of the attractiveness of the allotments that were to be distributed, Herod did not feel compelled

²⁴ For other examples of remission of taxes see, for instance, the treatment of Eumenes II toward a group of settlers in the region of Telmessus (M. Segre, “Iscrizioni di Licia” *Clara Rhodos* 9 (1938) 190, 11.15–17). In a letter of Antiochus III to the governor of Judea (quoted in Josephus *AJ* 12.138–44) the king grants a three year tax exemption and one third remission of the tribute in order to encourage the quick settlement of new and former inhabitants in Jerusalem (*AJ* 12.143–4). See also *AJ* 13.49, *OGIS* 229.101–2 and *RC* 51.23.

²⁵ See *RE* A12 (1937), 1865, s.v. “Trachonitis.”

²⁶ One should compare this situation with that of the Jewish settlers in Asia Minor who were promised a steady supply of grain until such time as they would be able to produce their own foodstuffs (*AJ* 12.152).

to grant tax exemptions to the settlers.²⁷ On the other hand the colony of Bathyra was located in rocky, uncultivated terrain made doubly unattractive by the hostility of the neighbours. The tax cuts offered the colonists were a necessary compensation.

But why found a city in one place and a colony in another? Of course the founding of a city would have been easier in Samaria, where a metropolis had once before existed than in the sparsely inhabited Batanaea. But more important perhaps than this logistical consideration was the strategic one. Josephus remarks how Herod founded Sebaste with the long range purpose of strengthening his hold on the area (*AJ* 15.292). The inhabitants were to be either local people or retired servicemen; that is, people whose loyalty was assured but who would not be expected to bear arms at a moments notice.²⁸

In Batanaea the situation was quite different. There Herod was faced with a continuing and very specific threat. According to Josephus, Herod's settlement had three immediate goals: to prevent further incursions by the Trachonites, to provide a base for counter-attacks against them and to protect Jewish pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem (*AJ* 17.23; 6).²⁹ For this he needed a force of men which was in a constant state of preparedness and which was located close to the particular threat. The simplest solution both logistically and strategically was a military colony composed of active mercenaries rather than a *polis* inhabited by local people and retired soldiers.

We have been referring to Bathyra as a military colony. It would be useful to determine in what ways the settlers were "military" and in what ways they were not. Of course the settlers were mounted-archers and their primary function was to defend Herod's border. The question facing us is whether or not they were obligated to serve actively in Herod's army. It has been held to by Tarn that military colonists in Hellenistic kingdoms had to serve in the royal army by

²⁷ Of course tax exemptions could be—and were—sometimes given for purely political reasons. See for example the situation described in the Corragus inscription (*SEG* 2.663.21–2); see also *AJ* 13.49.

²⁸ Gaba, another Herodian city in the north (near Mt. Carmel) was likewise settled with retired cavalymen (*AJ* 15.294; *BJ* 3.36).

²⁹ The stated purpose of the Jewish colonies in Lydia and Phrygia was to bring the native population—which was in revolt—back under Seleucid control (*AJ* 12.149). For other examples of colonies whose purpose was the pacification of particular regions see Bickerman (above, note 2) 85.

virtue of the land (*kléros*) they were given. Essentially they have been considered as a reserve force whose primary duty was border defense but who could be called up for active duty if the need arose.³⁰ The evidence from Bathyra however does not confirm this hypothesis. There is no mention in Josephus that the original settlers had any other obligations besides that of defending the border.³¹ Furthermore there is strong implicit proof in Josephus that although they were given land the original settlers were not burdened with a concomitant obligation to serve in Herod's regular army. Sometime after the colony's founding Jacimus, the son of the founder of Bathyra, organized the settlers to fight as cavalymen; in addition, a troop (*ἵλη*) of these now served as the royal bodyguard (*AJ* 17.29). The fact that Jacimus—and not his father—organized the settlers into a cavalry unit and sent part of it off to be a royal bodyguard indicates that prior to this the settlers did not serve in the royal army. For if they had already served then it would not have been necessary for Jacimus to form them into a fighting unit. Inasmuch as the original settlers did not serve in Herod's army but did receive land allotments from him it can be suggested that—for the Herodian military colonist at least—there was no obligation attached to the original allotments to serve in the royal army.

Finally, the political background to the establishment of the Batanean colony is of some interest. It provides a good indication that the settlement was planned by Herod as a countermeasure to Augustus' attempt to hinder his activity on his north-eastern border. As was noted earlier, the founding of the colony followed Augustus' sharp reaction to Herod's punitive expedition against the Arabs. The reasons for Augustus' reaction are difficult to understand. Herod after all did have the permission of the Roman governor of Syria to march out against the Arabs (*AJ* 16.283). It may be suggested that

³⁰ See for instance Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization*³ (London 1952) 146, G. T. Griffith *Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge 1935) 148 ff. and Oertel (above, note 17) col. 3. But see Bickerman (above, note 2) 78 and followed by M. Launey, [*Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* (Paris 1949) 49] who suggests that service in the Seleucid army was based on the principle of territorial recruitment.

³¹ In discussing these colonists Bickerman, (above, note 2) 86 likewise points out that "Les colons ne formaient pas un régiment... Ce n'étaient pas même des soldats bénéficiaires."

Herod overstepped his orders by entering into a battle with an Arab general in which some lives were lost. But Josephus is explicit in saying that Herod subsequently filed a report of the whole incident with Saturninus and that this report was accepted and approved (*AJ* 16.285). It may be argued—though it is unlikely—that Augustus had not yet received a report of the incident from the Syrian governor and so was unaware that the expedition had been approved. Or it may be, as Jones has suggested, that Augustus thought Herod “needed a rap on the knuckles” for acting too independently in an area beyond his frontier.³² Whatever the immediate explanation for Augustus’ reaction it is clear that he was reacting in a classic Roman fashion. From the third century B.C. on it had been Roman policy to allow client states to defend themselves against any threats, but not to react offensively to such threats.³³ To mention some examples: Eumenes II in his war against Pharnaces was discouraged by the Romans from proceeding into the latter’s territory (Polybius 24.15.4). Later Roman displeasure with Eumenes expressed itself in her subverting his attempts to defend himself against the Gauls and Prusias (Polybius 30.19).³⁴ And of course Carthage was not allowed by the Romans to defend herself adequately at the expense of Masinissa.³⁵ Augustus in preventing Herod from adequately defending himself against the threats of the Arabs was following a long established practice.

Thus Herod, like the earlier client-states, was faced with the problem of defending his borders while at the same time having his actions severely limited by Roman policy. His response was a shrewd attempt to reconcile these two apparently contradictory demands; furthermore it helps explain the very generous nature of the land grant to the colony. The land given the settlement was tax-free and was most probably also given outright to its leader, Zamaris. Zamaris was thus in a position to defend himself, to plunder and raid the neighbouring Arabs quite freely. The inevitable complaints by the Arabs

³² Jones (above, note 5) 125.

³³ P. C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire Under the Republic* (Cambridge 1908) 93 f.

³⁴ A similar Roman displeasure with Rhodes resulted in her withholding aid from the Rhodians in the latter’s war with the Cretan pirates (Polybius 33.16.7). See further the discussion in E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford 1958) 99–105.

³⁵ Badian (above, note 34) 125, 133.

to Herod would then have been met with the disclaimer that the Babylonian Jews were not bound to him and were not under his control. The result of this rather astute manoeuvre was to provide Herod with an adequate defense on his north-eastern frontier while at the same time relieving him of responsibility to the Romans for any "reaction-strikes" in the area. The problem posed by Augustus' action had reflected the use of an established Roman practice; Herod's response was to counter this with the use of an equally established Hellenistic institution.

From the narrative in Josephus there emerges a picture of a Hellenistic settlement which is important for the sharper focus it throws on a number of questions connected with this institution. As regards the internal arrangement of a settlement, the fact that the original founders were all Jews suggests that national uniformity was a desideratum in the founding of military colonies. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that Herod had earlier used only Idumaeans in the previous colony and by the fact that Antiochus III used only Jews—and not an admixture of various loyal groups—when he colonized Asia Minor. Furthermore there was no Greek civic form imposed on the colony; the settlers were allowed to govern themselves as they wished.

A second point raised by Josephus' account is that of the military obligation that was tied to a land grant. The position of Tarn and Griffith that Seleucid *kléroi* involved an obligation to serve in the royal army has been questioned by both Launey and Bickerman.³⁶ Certainly parallels from Herodian Palestine to Seleucid Asia must be used carefully—if at all. Nevertheless the fact that Herod's colonists were likewise not burdened does provide implicit support for the view of Bickerman.

The third point is that in discussing the Seleucid settlements scholars have usually limited themselves only to general discussions of the type(s) of colonies that might have existed.³⁷ The description of the colony in Batanaea suggests more specifically what one such type

³⁶ See above, notes 30 and 31.

³⁷ Thus Bickerman (above, note 2) 86 distinguishes between the Syrian type in which the colonists lived together in a settlement and the Egyptian type in which they were scattered among native villages. On the other hand Rostovtzeff (above, note 2) 491, 501 distinguishes between military and civil colonies and admits of variants within each group.

might have been. In Batanaea a nobleman was brought with his retinue to found a colony on land given to him. At Ammonitis a resident sheikh was entrusted with a colony. In Seleucid Asia noblemen were often given or sold land which included villages. The Seleucid willingness to hand over large estates to royal favourites was as much a part of their internal administrative policy as was the establishment of their numerous military colonies. One is therefore led to wonder if perhaps some of these Seleucid settlements were not also organized under the leadership of such royal favourites on lines similar to the Herodian colony.

And finally the political setting of the Batanaean colony is of some interest. It was classical Roman policy to discourage overly independent actions by her client states. In an attempt to satisfy both his own security needs and the strictures placed by Augustus' implementation of this policy Herod apparently gave the land of the colony to Zamaris. The result was to give the Babylonian relative freedom of action while at the same time freeing Herod of responsibility for such actions as Zamaris might take.³⁸

³⁸ It is a pleasure to record my gratitude to the referee of the Association for his valuable criticisms.